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Tribal-State Affairs: American States as

'Disclaiming' Sovereigns
David E. Wilkins

University of Arizona

The history of tribal-state political relations has been contentious from the beginning of the republic.
As a result of these tensions, the relationship of tribal nations and thefederal government was federalized
when the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788. Thus, a number of states, especially in the West, were
required in their organic acts and constitutions to forever disclaim jurisdiction over Indian property and
persons. This article analyzes these disclaimer clauses, explains thefactors that have enabled the states to
assume some jurisdictional presence in Indian Country, examines the key issues in which disclaimers
continue to carry significant weight, and argues that the federal government should reclaim its role as
the lone constitutional authority to deal with indigenous nations.

In Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council (1959)1, a federal
district court stated that "Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher
than that of states." Notwithstanding this statement, states have often acted as
if they were the political superiors of tribal nations. Such assertions of state

jurisdiction in Indian Country,2 absent tribal and federal consent, are problematic, however, because they violate the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty,s run afoul of the treaty relationship between federally recognized tribes
and the federal government, damage the federally recognized trust doctrine,4
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to thank reviewers for their careful reading of earlier versions of this essay.
Special thanks to Tsianina Lomawaima, David Gibbs, and Franke Wilmer for their critical comments and
suggestions.

'272 F. 2d 131 (1959).

2Broadly, it is country within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws relating to Indians are
generally applicable. It is also defined as all the land under the supervision and protection of the United

States government that has been set aside primarily for the use of Indians. This includes all Indian
reservations and any other area under federal jurisdiction and designated for Indian use (Title 18, U.S.
Code, Section 1151).

3Tribes, as preexisting polities, exercise a number of political and legal powers that only sovereigns
may wield, such as the power to adopt a form of government; to define the conditions of tribal citizenship/membership; to regulate the domestic relations of the tribe's citizens/members; to prescribe rules
of inheritance with respect to all personal property; to levy dues, fees, or taxes on tribal citizens and nonIndian residents; and to administer justice. For details, see the Solicitor's Opinion, "Powers of Indian
Tribes," Opinions of the Solicitor, 25 October 1934, 55 I.D. 14, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
the Interior, 1974), pp. 445-477.
4The "trust doctrine" or "trust responsibility," as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Seminole v.
United States, holds that there is a "distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited peoples. In carrying out its treaty obligations
with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self-imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of the Congress, and numerous
decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its
conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the

most exactingfiduciary standards, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 (1942).

? Publius: The Journal of Federalism 28:4 (Fall 1998)
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Furthermore, and most important for our purposes, state efforts to move
into the internal political and economic affairs of tribal nations within their

borders appears to violate the Indian disclaimer clauses that 11 Western
states (Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3) were required by the federal government to include in their territorial acts, enabling acts, and constitutions.
These 11 states are home to more than 80 percent of the United States
indigenous population and nearly all of the country's 278 Indian reservations. Those clauses, dating from Wisconsin's territorial disclaimer of 1836,
to Alaska's constitutional disclaimer of 1959, expressly declare that these
territories-later states-are precluded from extending their authority inside Indian Country. There is some important variation in language in these
measures (Tables 1-3). Generally, however, each contains language designed
to assure both tribes and the federal government that the territory/state
will never, without federal consent and/or a treaty modification, interfere

with the internal affairs of tribal nations.

For example, Arizona's disclaimer clause is found in Article 20: Ordinance,
4th and 5th sections, of the state's constitution, which became effective on

12 February 1912 when it was admitted to the Union. It reads:
The people inhabiting this State do agree and declare that they
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and
ungranted public lands lying within the boundaries thereof and
to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any
Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have
been acquired through or from the United States or any prior
sovereignty, and that, until the tide of such Indian or Indian
tribes shall have been extinguished, the same shall be, and remain, subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States...and no
taxes shall be imposed by this State on any lands or other property within an Indian Reservation owned or held by any Indian.6
The federal government, in requiring certain states to include these clauses,
assumed the double duty of "preserving to the Indians the quiet possession of
the reservation as their future home and protecting their persons and property
therein, and this duty and obligation still exists, never having been released by
the actions of the Indians or by treaty or agreement with them."7
5See, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
6Constitutions of the United States: National and State: Alaska (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications,

1993), p. 75.
7United States v. Ewing, 47 Fed. 809, 813 (1891), emphasis added.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DISCLAIMERS

Federalism in the United States has had a fluid history, and tr
fortunes have sometimes hinged on how the balancing contest

out between states and the federal government. From the
Confederation through the American Revolution, to the curr

gaming controversies," the colonies, territories, and later

frequently vied with the federal government for jurisdictiona
Indian people, lands, and resources.
Tribal nations are frustrated by the repeated federal and stat
of political dominance over their peoples and resources, but ins

taining the nation-to-nation political relationship established by tr

sustained by the trust doctrine with the federal government.
government maintains that it is the superior sovereign vis-a-v

and also the states with respect to the tribes. It also has acted to a

the sovereignty of the tribes (through treaties and the trust r

*The U.S. Supreme Court, Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235 (1919), held as much when
that state courts act practically as a federal agency when the Congress delegates authority
regarding Indian oil and gas royalties. "That the agency which is to approve or not is a sta
material. It is the agency selected by the Congress and the authority confided to it is t
giving effect to the will of the Congress in respect of a matter within its control. Thus i
the court in exercising that authority acts as a federal agency... Plainly, the restrictio
force and operate in the same way as if Congress had selected another agency, exclusively
the Superintendent of the Five Civilized Tribes" (p. 239).
9Office of the President, Executive Order 13084, "Consultation and Coordination wi
Governments," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 18 May 1998, vol. 34, no. 20
105 Wall. 787 (1867).
"See, for example, Heidi L. McNeil, "Indian Gaming: Prosperity and Controversy," A
Relationships in a Modern Arizona Economy, ed. Malcolm Merrill (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona

pp. 105-121.
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When the U.S. Constitution was drafted, the framers made a clear

declaration of federal supremacy over all matters relating to commerce
with Indian nations (i.e., the commerce clause). Some of the 13 original
states, however, especially Georgia and NewYork, continued to act as if they

had retained sovereignty over Indian affairs, and they continued to conduct relations with tribes as if the commerce clause were not present.'3

Nevertheless, when the Congress of the Confederation enacted the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,14 it provided for three stages of government
for the territories and states into which the region was to be divided. First,

authority was to be exercised by federal appointees. In the second stage,
authority was to be shared by these appointees and a representative assembly, with the governor still appointed by the president. Finally, the state was to

be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the old states.15 This third
stage was fulfilled only after the territory had attained a population of 60,000
free inhabitants and adopted a constitution, created a republican form of government, and determined the qualifications for voting and holding office.
Article Three of the ordinance stated that the federal government would

always observe the "utmost good faith" toward Indians and that their lands
and property would never be taken without tribal consent. Thus, while a
few of the 13 original states would continue to contest federal supremacy in

the nation's commercial and political affairs with tribes, the Northwest
Ordinance, alongside the commerce clause and treaty relationship, unequivocally acknowledged that the federal government was in charge of
the nation's Indian policy in the territories.
'2See, for example, Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Americanizing the American Indians: Writings by the 'Friends

of the Indian:' 1880-1900 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973); Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final
Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
"3See Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1996).
'4See Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1987); Daniel J. Elazar, ed., "Land and Liberty in American Society: The Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Fall 1988):

entire issue.

"SPaul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington, D.C.: Government Printi
Office, 1968), p. 72.
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WHY THE NEED FOR DISCLAIMERS?

Commentators who have researched disclaimers have pro

explanations for why the federal government crafted territo
disclaimers. We can group the explanations into three interre
ries: expediency, treaties/trust, and exclusive/supremacy.
Expediency

This argument holds that the Indians were to be protected in their lands
only until such time as they were ready to be removed or assimilated. However:

As the removal policy was winding down, the pace at which

were being settled, formed, and admitted to the union b
outstrip the speed with which the federal government c
move tribes from the states prior to statehood. Thus, be
with the admission of Wisconsin and Kansas, Congress b

insist that some states disclaim authority andjurisdiction ov

gering vestiges of Indian country by including such disc

in the enabling or statehood legislation in their state constitu

This explanation does not tell us, however, why the Con
that only some states agree to such a disclaimer. Presumab

WilliamJ. Brennan put it, it had "more to do with historical tim

'6Robert N. Clinton, Nell Jessup Newton, and Monroe E. Price, American Ind
Materials, 3rd ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Michie, 1991), pp. 500-501.

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:48:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

60

Publius/Fall

deliberate

1998

congression

McBratney'8 decision of
determining which stat

be discussed later.

Treaties/Trust

According to Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, "at the time Congress required
the disclaimers, they were necessary to protect Indian populations from
homesteaders and settlers. By demanding the disclaimers, the federal government acknowledged its obligation to stand between these two hostile
groups and prevent continuing exploitation of the Indians."'9 Congress,
says Goldberg-Abrose:
Began insisting on disclaimers of state jurisdiction over Indian
reservations immediately after United States Supreme Court
decisions first indicated the possibility that suchjurisdiction could

be exercised. Viewed in this light, the disclaimers are more than
protection against Indian loss of real property interests; they are

congressional insulation against state jurisdiction over reserva-

tion Indians.20

For example, in United States v. Stahl,21 a United States circuit court held

that when Kansas was admitted to the Union, it came in on an equal footing with the original states and although the federal government retained
title to the land it owned within the state, it relinquishedjurisdiction over it

insofar as the general purposes of government were concerned with certain exceptions. "The first exception reserved the lands of Indian tribes
which had treaties exempting them from state jurisdiction; the second, the
power to tax the lands of the United States and of the Indians."22
It is the treaty dimension that receives the slightest amount of treatment

in contemporary judicial, state, or congressional discussions about tribalstate relations; yet, it is a most important dimension. The Cherokee Treaty of
182823 contained explicit language in this regard. The Cherokee were guaran-

teed a "permanent" home in their newly acquired western lands, and they
were assured by the federal negotiators that "under the most solemn guarantee of the United States," it would remain theirs forever. It would be a home
"that shall never, in all future time, be embarrassed by having extended around
it the lines, or placed over it the jurisdiction of a Territory or State."24
"'Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 463 U.S. 545, 562 (1983).

l8104 U.S. 621 (1881).
'9Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation
Indians," UCLA Law Review 22 (October 1974): 570.
20Ibid.

2127 Fed. Cas. No. 16, 373 (1868).
nIbid., 1289.

237 Stat. 311-15.

24Ibid., 311.
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this nation-to-nation status. Article One states: "Said nation or tribe of In-

dians through their authorized Chiefs aforesaid do hereby acknowledge
and declare that they are lawfully and exclusively under the laws, jurisdiction, and government of the United States of America."26
This argument is also supported by the language found in congressional
reports like those accompanying debates on statehood. An adverse report
attached to a House report2" on the "Admission of Dakota, Montana, Washington, and New Mexico," written by Representative William Springer of
the Committee on the Territories, recognized the extraterritorial and nontaxable nature of Indian Country, which had been confirmed in Dakota's
territorial disclaimer clause of 1861. That measure provided that:
Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
rights or person or property now pertaining to the Indians in
said Territory, so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished

by treaty between the United States and such Indians, or to include any territory which, by treaty with any Indian tribe, is not,
without the consent of said tribe, to be included within the territorial limits orjurisdiction of any State or Territory; but all such

territory shall be excepted out of the boundaries and constitute
no part of the Territory of Dakota, until said tribe shall signify

their assent to the President of the United States to be included

within the said Territory or to affect the authority of the govern-

ment of the United States to make any regulations respecting
such Indians, their lands, property, or other rights by treaty law,

or otherwise, which it would have been competent for the government to make if this act had never been passed.28
Thus, Springer, in authoring his negative report, was reminding his fellow

committee members of both the sovereign and the separate proprietary
interests of the Indians who had not consented to any alteration of their
land base. He further noted that a major reason against statehood was the
fact that there were nine Indian reservations in the territory, the jurisdiction over which was reserved exclusively in the federal government so long
25Ibid., 355.
2610 Stat. 979.

27U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Territories, Admission ofDakota, Montana, Washington, and New
Mexico into the Union, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1888.
28U.S. Government Printing Office, "Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota," The Federal
and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies, ed.

Francis N. Thorpe, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), pp. 28-46.
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Exclusion/Supremacy

Maxwell Carr-Howard states that Congress' protection of its absolute

control over the nation's relations with tribes was evidenced in the fact that

"many western states were given a clear message to avoid any involvement
in tribal lands and governments when Congress required, as a condition of
their admittance into the Union, that each state 'forever disclaim all right
and title to Indian lands within their borders.'"'3 Michael Lieder corroborates this view by maintaining that the "scanty evidence available indicates
that Congress [in making disclaimers] intended only to ensure that the
United States retained jurisdiction over Indians and Indian affairs that it
already enjoyed in other states."3'
Finally, Glen Davies has argued that Congress, as a result of the McBratney

decision of 1881, required each state admitted to the Union between 1881
and 1912 to guarantee in its constitution that absolute jurisdiction over
Indian lands would remain lodged in the federal government until such
time as the Indians gained a measure of proprietary independence from

federal trust restrictions on their lands.32

There is more evidence supporting this third rationale than for the first
two. For example, in The Kansas Indians,33 which combines elements of
exclusive/supremacy and treaties/trust, the Supreme Court held that the

various treaties made between the Shawnee and other tribes and the United

States required that the federal government protect the persons and property

of the Indians upon their reservations and that this duty was not terminated by the admission of Kansas into statehood. In the Court's words:

There can be no question of State sovereignty in the case, as
Kansas accepted her admission into the family of States on condition that the Indian rights should remain unimpaired and the
general government at liberty to make any regulation respecting them, their lands, property, or other rights....While the gen-

eral government has a superintending care over their interests,
-U.S. House, Admission of Dakota, p. 24.
S3Maxwell Carr-Howard, "Tribal-State Relations: Time for Constitutional Stature?" New Mexico Law
Review 26 (Spring 1996): 294-295.
"3Michael Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amendment: Two Courts
are Better Than One," Georgetown LawJournal 71 (February 1983): 1031.
S2Glen E. Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," Utah Law Review (July 1966): 137.
"572 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866).
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Sandoval,36 affirmed that the

United States had a trust obligation to protect the lands of the Pueblo n

tions from non-Indian intruders. The court also held that the disclaimer

clause in New Mexico's enabling act unquestionably confirmed that the
state assented to the federal government's exercise of exclusive authority to

regulate commerce with the Indians.

Finally, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,37 the U.S. Suprem

Court again confirmed the exclusive nature of the tribal-federal relation
ship by holding that "since the signing of the Navajo treaty, the Congre
has consistently acted upon the assumption that the States lacked jurisd
tion over Navajos living on the reservation.""8 This was most clearly evi

denced in Arizona's disclaimer clause in which the state's entry to the Union
was expressly conditioned on the promise that the state would "forever d
claim all right and title to...all lands lying within said boundaries owned
held by any Indian or Indian tribes.""39
Whichever reason or combination of reasons is accepted, the commo
denominator among all is that Congress intended to retain its exclusiv
relationship with tribal nations based on treaties, trust, and preemption
and that states were completely removed from this dyadic affair. Howev
because of federalism's fluidity--sometimes supporting a strong nation
34Ibid., 755-757.
S5United States v. Ewing, 47 Fed. 809, 813 (1891).

36231 U.S. 28 (1913).
37411 U.S. 164 (1973).

38Ibid., 175.
"3Ibid.
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TERRITORIAL DISCLAIMERS

Territorial governance was carried out by a few federal officials wh
in each of the territories-a governor, a secretary, and three or mor

each appointed by the president. Surveyors, revenue collectors,
and other officials came from Washington and provided service
tories.40 The territorial governors were assigned a multitude
For instance, the governor of the Oregon Territory, which w
lished in 1848, was commander-in-chief of the militia, served as the
superintendent of Indian affairs, could grant pardons for offenses against
the territory's laws, and was chief executive officer.41 The most distinctive feature of the territorial system was its transitional and progressive
character, looking toward statehood. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress retained supreme power over the territories, which makes the insertion of disclaimer clauses in the territorial acts all the more interesting
given that Congress and the president already had exclusive authority
under the U.S. Constitution.

Twelve territorial acts (Table 1) contained express Indian disclaim

clauses. The act establishing the territorial government of Wisconsin,
example, had two references to Indians. Section 4 contained a clause sim

lar to that found in the U.S. Constitution in two places in which Indians are

excluded from official population enumeration for determining congr
sional representation.42
The enumeration clause of the Wisconsin statute, which is also found

in the other territorial acts, stated that "an apportionment shall
made...among the several counties for the election of the counc
and representatives, giving to each section of the Territory rep
sentation in the ration of its population, Indians excepted, as nea
as may be."43

4oEarl S. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States: 1861-1890 (Philadelphia: University of Penn
vania Press, 1947).
4'Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions, p. 2986.
42Article 1, sec. 2, clause 3; Fourteenth Amendment, sec. 2.
435 Stat. 10.

This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Tue, 03 Dec 2019 19:48:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Tribal-State

Affairs

65

Table 1
Territories with Indian Disclaimer Clauses

Territory Date Key language
Wisconsin 1836 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty.
Iowa 1838 Same as above.

Oregon 1848 Same as above.
Washington 1853 Federal government retains power to make Indian policy
treaty or law.

Kansas 1854 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty

Indian lands not to be included in territory without tribal consent

Nebraska 1854 Same as above.

Colorado 1861 Same as above.

North Dakota 1861 Indian rights not to be impaired.
Idaho 1863 Same as above.

Montana 1864 Indian rights not to be impaired unt

Indian lands not to be included in territory w

Wyoming 1868 Indian rights not to be impaired.
Oklahoma 1890 Indian rights not to be impaired until extinguished by treaty.

The disclaimer clause is found in Section 1 which, among other things,

demarcated the territorial boundaries of Wisconsin:

Nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair the
rights of person or property now appertaining to any Indians
within the said Territory so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the United States and such Indians, or to impair the obligations of any treaty now existing
between the United States and such Indians, or to impair or
anywise to affect the authority of the Government of the United

States to make any regulations respecting such Indians, their
lands, property, or other rights, by treaty, or law, or otherwise,
which it would have been competent to the Government to make

if this act had never been passed."

Federal lawmakers were warning the territorial residents and their leader
not to interfere with the treaty relationship between the tribes and the fed-

eral government, which outlined the duties and responsibilities of both
parties. The United States' exclusive and constitutionally grounded au
thority to enact regulations dealing with tribes and their property or
rights, whether derived from treaties or laws, was not to be intruded
upon either.
44Ibid., 11.
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Iowa's territorial disclaimer of 1838 was identical to Wisconsin's.45

Oregon's, enacted in 1848,46 was substantially similar, though it did not
repeat the section found in Wisconsin's and Iowa's, which stated: "or to
impair the obligations of any treaty now existing between the United States

and such Indians." Washington's territorial act contained an even more
abbreviated disclaimer and excluded the section on impairing the rights of
Indians, absent a treaty change.47
The 1854 territorial act for Kansas and Nebraska,48 however, returned to

the lengthy recognition of Indian treaty rights and the securing of Indian
consent that had been deleted from Washington's act. It emphasized the
extraterritorial nature of Indian Country until and unless the tribes requested otherwise. The relevant phrases were that nothing would impair
Indian rights "so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty
between the United States and such Indians, or to include any territory
which, by treaty with any Indian tribe, is not, without the consent of said
tribe, to be included within the territorial limits orjurisdiction of any State

or Territory; but all such territory shall be excepted out of the

boundaries...until said tribe shall signify their assent to the President of

the United States."''49

The acts for Colorado (1861), Dakota and Idaho (1863), and Montana

(1864) read virtually identical to the one for Kansas and Nebraska.
Wyoming's 1868 act returned to the brevity of Washington's measure. The
act said simply "that nothing in this act shall be construed to impair the
rights of person or property now pertaining to the Indians in said Territory,

so long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the

United States and such Indians."50

Interestingly, territories such as New Mexico (1850), Arizona (1863),

Michigan (1805), Alaska (1854), and Minnesota (1844), which were the
aboriginal home of many indigenous groups, contained no express disclaimers. The only references to Indians in those territorial acts were contained
in the enumeration section (Indians cannot be counted for purposes of
determining the number of representatives) and a statement declaring that
the governor of the territory was also the superintendent of Indian affairs.
A major exception to what hasjust been discussed is the unique development of

the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma). While this area has been admirably
treated by a number of scholars,5' suffice it to say that a majority of the
Indian nations now inhabiting Oklahoma either migrated there or were
45Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 2, 1112.

469 Stat. 323.

47Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 7, 3963.

4810 Stat. 277.

49Ibid., 277-278.
5"Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 7, 4106.

51See, for example, Grant Foreman, The Five Civilized Tribes (Norman, OK University of Oklahoma
Press, 1934); Angie Debo, And Still the Waters Run: The Betrayal of the Five Civilized Tribes (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1940).
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federal government to p
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The clause reads as follows:

That nothing in this act shall be construed to impair any right
now pertaining to any Indians or Indian tribe in said Territory
under the laws, agreements, and treaties of the United States, or
to impair the rights of person or property pertaining to said Indians, or to affect the authority of the Government of the United
States to make any regulation or to make any law respecting said
Indians, their lands, property, or other rights which it would have

been competent to make or enact if this act had not been
passed.53
ENABLING ACT DISCLAIMERS

These organic laws strike at the heart of the tension between
states as well as the doctrine of federalism. Enabling acts outlin
a territory's citizenry must take to become a state. Thus, the in
disclaimer clauses in these core political documents was an expli
nition of the supremacy of the federal government over Indian

though states chafed at this reservation, claiming that it was an inf
on their rights, as a federal court noted in United States v. Board o

sioners of Osage County,54 "there cannot be an invasion of State

cause a condition of statehood was the reserving by the Federal Gov

of power and authority over Indians, their lands and property."5
The Congress passed the first enabling act on 30 April 1802. This

rized the inhabitants of the eastern district of the Northwest Territories to

elect representatives to a convention and to draft a constitution. The act
524 Stat. 729.

"5Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 5, 2940.

"26 F. Sup. 270 (1939).

55Ibid., 275.
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Table 2

State Enabling Acts with Indian Disclaimer Clauses

State Date Key language
Kansas 1861 Indian rights not to be impaired unless extinguished
Indian lands not to be included in state without tribal consent.

Tribe must signify their assent to the President to be included in

the State.

North Dakota 1889 The People and the State forever disclaim all rights to Indian

lands; those lands remain under absolute federal jurisdiction.
State may only tax land of individual Indians who have severed

tribal relations but not if that land was granted by the Congress with

an express tax exemption.
South Dakota 1889 Same as above.

Montana 1889 Same as above.

Washington 1889 Same as above.
Utah 1894 Same as above.

Oklahoma 1906 Indian rights are not to be impair

been extinguished. Federal government r

authority to make Indian policy by treaty,
New Mexico 1910 Same as Utah.

Arizona 1910 Same as above.

Alaska 1958 The People and the State forever disclaim all right to Indian

land and to any land or other property (e.g., fishing rights) held

in trust by the United States. All lands and property under absolute

federal jurisdiction, except when held in fee simple title.

also specified how the members were to be appointed among the counties,
determined when elections were to be held, specified the time and place
for the convention, and stipulated that the constitution must be republican."
Although the Congress easily created territories, it was far more reluctant to

create states. Before developments in the late 1880s, only four western
states had entered the Union: two during the Civil War (Kansas in 1861
and Nevada in 1864) and two after the war (Nebraska in 1867 and Colorado in

1876.)57 Six territories finally gained statehood in 1889 and 1890, and each

had a disclaimer clause in its constitution.

Nine of the eighteen western states had disclaimer clauses in the
enabling acts (Table 2). Wyoming and Idaho were admitted to statehoo
without enabling acts because their territorial governments launched sta

hood and proposed constitutions that were largely in compliance with federa
policies.58 Both states included disclaimers, however, in their constitutio
The first enabling act containing an explicit disclaimer clause was t

56Gates, History of Public Land Law, 289.
57Clyde A. Milner II et al., eds., The Oxford History of the American West (New York: Oxford Univers

Press, 1994), p. 184.

58Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, ed. Rennard Strickland, et al., revised

(Charlottesville, VA: Michie, Bobbs-Merrill, 1982), p. 268.
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invalidating

nario arose in 1876 when Colorado was the first state admitted after the

treaty-termination measure of 1871. Although Colorado's territorial act
contained a disclaimer, the Colorado Constitution did not. In 1881, the

U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. McBratney' that because Colo-

rado had not expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over the Ute

Indian Reservation, state law prevailed on the reservation.
Every state, except Hawai'i, admitted after McBratney was required to
acknowledge the federal government's "absolute jurisdiction and control"

over Indian reservations.6" There is a fairly clear correlation between
McBratney and the inclusion of Indian disclaimer clauses. Davies argues
that the insistence on disclaimers after McBratney was a direct response to
the federal government's loss of jurisdiction to the states after the decision," while Lieder asserts that the "temporary conjunction of McBratney
and the clauses strongly suggests they were a response to that decision."''67

5912 Stat. 126-127.
6Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1032-1033.
6116 Stat. 544.

6270 U.S. (11 Wall.) 116 (1871).
6'Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," 136.
64104 U.S. 621.

'Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1033.

"Davies, "State Taxation on Indian Reservations," 137.
67Lieder, "Adjudication of Indian Water Rights," 1033.
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The 1889 enabling act o
Washington6" was the
section four entails the

That the people inhabi
declare that they for

unappropriated

thereof...and that until the title thereto shall have been

publi

extinguished by the United States, the same shall be a
remain subject to the disposition of the United States, a
said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisd

tion and control of the Congress of the United States.... Bu
nothing herein, or in the ordinances herein provided for, s
preclude the said States from taxing as other lands are tax

any lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed
tribal relations, and has obtained from the United States or

from any person a title thereto by patent or other grant, save

and except such lands as have been or may be granted to
any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress containing a
provision exempting the lands thus granted from taxation.69
This provision guarantees that the federal government retains undivided
jurisdiction over Indian lands until the Indians are granted their land free
and clear of all restrictions. Said Indian lands would also be exempt from
state taxation because of the trust doctrine. The lands were further pro-

tected because, in some cases, specific laws had been enacted by the
Congress exempting the lands from taxation for specified periods of
time. The only way a state could tax an Indian's property under the

disclaimers was when an individual had chosen to terminate his or her

membership with their tribe or, in the case of allotted tribes, land w

subject to taxation once an individual received a patent to his oth

allotment. However, unlike most of the territorial disclaimers, there is

no mention in this 1889 act of the treaty that originally established
basis of Indian rights, nor is there any mention of the fact that Ind
consent would be required before either the state or the federal gov
ment could act against Indian rights. These last points reflect the ge
eral policy tenor of the times, with the federal government intent

civilizing, privatizing, and Christianizing Indian peoples. Indian c

sent was rarely sought, and treaty rights, while still theoretically int
were frequently ignored and often terminated during this period. Uta

enabling act of 16 July 1894 was virtually identical to the one ab
However, Oklahoma's act of 16 June 1906, which spliced togeth

6825 Stat. 676.
6Ibid., 677.
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to which was to be resp
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cific property right--the
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CONSTITUTIONAL DISCLAIMERS

State constitutions not only protect rights, they more important
framework for state and local government, allocate powers, an
policy commitments and, not infrequently, prescribe the me
those commitments will be met. At the most fundamental lev
embody the political identity and aspirations of the state's citizen
Congress insisted on the insertion of disclaimer clauses in
18 Western state constitutions (Table 3). Generally, the disc
sions of a state's enabling acts were simply appended to the n
constitution. For example, Article One of Montana's Constit
the Compact with the United States, declares that "all provi
enabling act of Congress...including the agreement and decla
all lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes shall r
7034 Stat. 267-268.

7136 Stat. 557.
"7Ibid., 559.

7-G. Alan Tarr, ed., Constitutional Politics in the States: Contemporary Controversies and H

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. xiv.
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Table 3

States with Constitutional Indian Disclaimer Clauses

State Date Key language

North Dakota 1889 The People forever disclaim all right and title to Indian
they remain subject to U.S. disposition and under absolute fe

jurisdiction. State may only tax individual Indian land if perso
has severed tribal relations and has title to land. Lands grante
Congress containing tax exemption, however, are not taxable by
South Dakota 1889 Same as above.

Montana 1889 All lands owned or held by Indians remain under absolute

jurisdiction and control of the Congress until revoked by consent

the United States and people of Montana.

Washington 1889 Same as North Dakota.

Wyoming 1890 People forever disclaim all right and title to Indian land
lands subject to absolute federal jurisdiction

Idaho 1890 People and State forever disclaim all right and title to India
those lands subject to absolute federal jurisdiction.

Utah 1896 Same as North Dakota.

Oklahoma 1907 The People forever disclaim all right and tit
remain subject to United States jurisdiction.

New Mexico 1912 Same as North Dakota.
Arizona 1912 Same as North Dakota.

Alaska 1959 State and People disclaim all right and title to any

including fishing rights; such property subject to absol
jurisdiction. State will not impose taxes on Indian prop
directed by the Congress, except for lands held in fee s

the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of t

continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consen

States and the people of Montana."74 The state was bound
clause until both the federal government and the citizen
agreed to modify the provision.

Similarly, North Dakota's enabling act, including the disclai

minor word changes, was incorporated as Article XIII, a C
United States, and its provisions were declared to be "irr

the consent of the United States and the people of the state."
only stylistic alterations, the constitutional disclaimers of th

states, including South Dakota, Washington, Oklahoma, N
zona, and Alaska, all very closely resembled the disclaimer

enabling acts. Idaho and Wyoming, which had been ad

74Constitutions of the United States, National and State, Montana, 1995 (Dobbs Fer

tions, December 1995), p. 1.
75Ibid., March 1995, 36.
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express instances, deleg
Indian affairs to the st
Indian Country.
FEDERAL DELEGATIONS OF EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY

The first major action by federal policymakers involving a reading

clauses that negated the territorial sovereignty of Indian trib

States v. McBratney.7s This criminal case raised the issue of w
rado had jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had murdered a

Indian on the Ute Indian Reservation. The United States
existing law, both statutory and treaty, gave it jurisdiction over

The government also cited Colorado's 1861 territorial act, whic

provision expressly disclaimingjurisdiction. However, neither Colo

organic act, which admitted that territory to the Union, nor

stitution, which was approved the following year, included discla

The U.S. Supreme Court held that because Colorado had

ted on an equal footing with the original states and had not
claimed jurisdiction over the Ute Reservation, and because no
directly involved in the case, state law and not federal law g
crimes on the reservation.

Four years later, in 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down another
ruling which recognized that in some limited respects, states could wield
measure ofjurisdiction in Indian Country. In Utah and Northern Railroad v
Fisher,79 the Court stated that the Idaho Territory had a legitimate interest

in regulating the affairs of whites, even if those activities took place on
reservation. In this case, the Court upheld Idaho's authority to tax a nonIndian railroad company, which ran its line through the Fort Hall India
Reservation. Idaho's 1863 territorial disclaimer,so like that of Colorado's
76Ibid.,January 1994, 40-41.
77Ibid., 41.

78104 U.S. 621 (1881).
79116 U.S. 28 (1885).

8012 Stat. 808.
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protects the treaty righ
but in the Court's readi
road to stand because In
The next major era in w
portion of Indian Coun
Termination, Congress' ef
to certain Indian groups
1960s. A key act during
conferred upon several
Nebraska, Oregon, and
tion over most reservatio
of such jurisdiction by
The language of the act
executing; that is, it co
without the need for stat
these mandatory states
before assuming jurisdi
However, optional state

issue. Section 6 declared that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby
given to the people of any State to amend, where necessary, their
State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and crimi-

nal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effec-

tive with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by an such
State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their
State constitution or statutes as the case may be.8"

Thus, in authorizing the optional states to assume jurisdiction if the
chose, the Congress specifically identified those states with constitution
or statutory disclaimers, and then required those states to repeal their di

claimers by a constitutional amendment before the act became oper
tional.84 These states were informed that to assume such jurisdictio

would require "the people of the State...by affirmative legislative action
to act accordingly.
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, who has written extensively about P.L. 280,
states that tribes were upset with the law because their consent was n
8167 Stat. 588.

82Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 563.

8367 Stat. 588.

84Schwartz, "State Disclaimers ofJurisdiction," 188.
85See, for example, "Public Law 280," p. 538; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Planting Tail Feather: Tribal
Survival and Public Law 280 (Los Angeles, CA: American Indian Studies Center, 1997).
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to vest in some states c
state disclaimer clauses
such jurisdiction otherw
rior, put it in response
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, when asked

his office's views on H.R. 1063---the bill that became P.L. 280:
In each instance [states with disclaimer clauses] the State constitution contains an appropriate disclaimer. It would appear in
each case, therefore, that the Congress would be required to
give its consent and the people of each State would be required
to amend the State constitution before the State legally could
assume jurisdiction.87
The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee echoed this sentiment in its

report, which stated that the "effect of the disclaimer of jurisdiction

Indian land within the borders of these States-in the absence of consent

being given to future action to assume jurisdiction-is to retain exclu
Federal jurisdiction until Indian title in such lands is extinguished; s
States could, under the bill as reported, proceed to amendment of th
respective organic laws by proper amending procedure.""88
Despite the clarity in the language of P.L. 280 and the congression
record regarding the conditions under which both mandatory (origi
five states) and optional (all remaining states) states could assume juri
tion in Indian Country, six of the eight optional states (Arizona, Mon
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington) with disclaimer cl

have passed legislation claiming full or, in some cases, partial jurisdiction o
Indian residents on reservation lands.89 Of these six states, however, only S

Dakota has acted to amend its constitutions as required under the 1953 law

The noncompliant states claim, contrary to the law's explicit langua
that a constitutional amendment is not required to assume jurisdicti
under P.L. 280. They claim that, in fact, their disclaimers only requ
that reservation lands remain under the "absolute jurisdiction and con

86This crucial dimension was changed with amendments to the act in 1968, the Indian Civil Right
(ICRA) (82 Stat. 77). One of the ICRA's provisions is that future assertions of statejurisdiction under P.

will require Indian consent. States can also return jurisdiction to the federal government if they
87U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, ConferringJurisdiction on the

of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, With Respect to Criminal Offenses and Civil Ca
Action Committed orArisingon Indian Reservations Within Such States, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, S. Rep. 699

88Ibid., 6.

89Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 569.
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would neither extinguish
States. The Court proce
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over Alaskan native lands in the United States. The Court maintained that

90Golberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 569-570.
"9See, for example, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1961).
92See, for example, Worcester v. Georgia, 582, where ChiefJustice John Marshall said that "the language
used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice...How the words of th
treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the

rule of construction."

93Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 573.
94369 U.S. 60 (1961).

95Ibid., 69.
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Despite these few cases, the preponderance of constitutional, treaty,

statutory, and judicial evidence, plus the ongoing extraconstitutional
status of tribes as preexisting sovereigns, support the view that the relationship between tribes and the United States remains a federalized one.
Disclaimer clauses occupy an important position of validity confirming the
nation-to-nation relationship. Until these clauses have been deliberately
expunged out of the enabling act, with federal approval, and jettisoned
from the state's constitution, with the consent of the state's citizenry and
the federal government's permission, they remain the law of the land.
96Ibid.

97Schwartz, "State Disclaimers," 187-190; Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 571-573.
98Goldberg-Ambrose, "Public Law 280," 571.

99Ibid.

'00Ibid.

'o'Schwartz, "State Disclaimers," 187-188, says that Ralph Barney, then chief of the Indian Claims
Branch of the Justice Department and the author of Alaska's enabling act disclaimer, testified during
Senate hearings that the disclaimer was meant to preserve the federal government's police power over
Alaskan natives on reservations. This testimony seems contrary to the view expressed in Kake that the
disclaimer limited only the state's "proprietary" interest in indigenous lands.
'02Ibid., 188-189.
103400 U.S. 423 (1971).
'"411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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AN EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP

The U.S. Supreme Court's 1832 Worcester?05 opinion confirm
law was inapplicable inside Indian Country and that any att
states to assert jurisdiction would be rebuffed on account of
eignty, the nation's treaty-based relationship with tribes, and
exclusivity in determining the United States' Indian policy.
The constitutionally affixed tribal-federal relationship rem
federalized despite the sporadic case and statutory examples

previous section, and notwithstanding the reality that the Rehnq

since 1989, presumes a share of state authority in Indian Co

the state has been expressly precluded from exercisingjurisdictio

a constitutional amendment to the commerce clause, a bilater

tion of the treaty relationship, or agreed-upon amendments to st

and constitutional disclaimer clauses, the relationship betwe
the federal government will remain the key partnership. A
gress will sometimes pass measures, like the Indian Gaming
Act,107 which require tribes and states to negotiate compact
types of gaming, this measure's very existence is a reminder
the federal government has ultimate responsibility for Indian
For example, in United States v. Rickert,10o the U.S. Suprem
that the federal government's constitutional power to dispose
all needful rules for property belonging to the United States
bined with South Dakota's constitutional disclaimer clause, pr
state from taxing Indian land. "No authority exists," said the
the State to tax lands which are held in trust by the United S

purpose of carrying out its policy in reference to these Indians."

In Dick v. United States,110 a liquor-law case, the Court sust
liquor statutes protecting lands ceded by the Nez Perce Indi
liquor introduction for a 25-year period. The Court held that

a state is admitted on an equal footing with other states, the Con

to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is "superior and para
authority of any State within whose limits are Indian tribe

later, in United States v. Sutton,"' the Court construed the discla

in Washington State's enabling act to mean that the federal
retained exclusive jurisdiction and control over the matter of

duction on a reservation.

'5 Worcester v. Georgia, 515.

'"See, for example, Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Brendale v. Conf
erated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); County of Yakima v. Yakima Ind
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
'07102 Stat. 2475.

108188 U.S. 432 (1903).
'"gIbid., 441.

01208 U.S. 340 (1907).
"'215 U.S. 291 (1909).
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committed within the Isleta Pueblo because the U.S. Constitution vests ex-

clusive authority over such crimes in the federal government. Althou
the state's enabling act admitted New Mexico into the Union "on an equ
footing" with the original states, "the principle of equality is not disturb
by a legitimate exertion by the United States of its constitutional power
respect of its Indian wards and their property.""'

It was not only federal courts which confirmed the tribal-feder
relationship. There is also some corroborating case law from states.

State v. Arthur,"4 the Idaho Supreme Court declared that the admission
Idaho into the Union did not operate to repeal hunting rights reserved
treaty to the Nez Perce Indians. Although Idaho's admission act was sile
regarding Indian rights, both the organic act and the state's constitutio
"recognize their rights which arise under the Treaty of 1855 and subs
quent agreements and treaties prior to statehood.""15
In Chino v. Chino,"6 the New Mexico Supreme Court, in discussing th
state's enabling act, which contained a disclaimer clause, held that the st
had declined to assume jurisdiction over the Indian reservations in the st
by failing to take "affirmative steps under Public Law 280" or under mo
recent congressional acts. Thus, "the treaties and statutes applicable in
this case preclude the state from exercisingjurisdiction over property ly
within the reservation boundaries.""'17

In closing, the New Mexico court gave a multifaceted rationale on wh
the state is precluded from assuming jurisdiction over forcible entry a
wrongful detainer actions on fee-patented lands within reservations. Th

list of reasons confirms many of the arguments identified above: (1) inheren
tribal sovereignty; (2) treaties, which vest in the federal government exclus
jurisdiction; (3) no affirmative delegation by the federal or tribal governmen

authorizing the state to act; (4) the state can only act where asserted tri

relations are not involved and where the rights of Indians would not bejeopa

dized; (5) the state may not act where the United States has preempted t

field by treaties or relevant statutes; and (6) state enabling and constitutiona
disclaimers expressly deny states the power to assume such jurisdiction.

112290 U.S. 357 (1933).
"3Ibid., 365.
"114261 P. 2d 135 (1953).

"SIbid., 138.
1690 NM 203 (1977).
"7Ibid., 206.
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CONCLUSION

We have examined a significant body of historical, lega

evidence regarding the tribal-state relationship and the rol
government in overseeing that relationship. In 1836, the

to insert disclaimer clauses in territorial acts, followed by sim

state enabling acts in 1861 and state constitutions in 1889.

that 11 Western state constitutions contain a disclaimer clause. The inclu-

sion of such clauses appears to be due primarily to the U.S. Supreme Court's
1881 McBratney decision, which held that in the absence of a state constitutional disclaimer clause, state law can prevail on an Indian reservation in
cases involving non-Indians. The primary purposes of these clauses are to
reiterate exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs, reaffirm tribal sovereignty vis-a-vis the states, and remind states that their sovereignty in the
federal system does not extend into Indian Country. Although states have
often chafed at these limits, the disclaimer clauses have helped to protect
tribal sovereignty.
Nevertheless, over the last two centuries, certain congressional policies,
such as termination, allotment, and especially P.L. 280, as well as some U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, have variously assaulted or eroded the protections afforded tribes by the disclaimer clauses. As a result, there is concern
among tribes about the ability of the disclaimer clauses to help protect their
sovereignty, especially in light of the controversy surrounding Indian gaming and Indian assertions of both sovereign rights and treaty rights in recent decades. Tribes, therefore, have taken a number of legal, political,
and educational steps to strengthen protection of their sovereignty.
Some tribes have worked out sovereignty accords with their host states in
which both parties agree to respect the sovereignty of the other.118 Such
action significantly augments tribal sovereignty and is, therefore, a step toward improving tribal-state relations. But it is only a step because intergovernmental relations with tribes as a recognized party is a difficult field to
navigate due to the preconstitutional and extraconstitutional status of tribal
nations whose members/citizens also enjoy rights as United States citizens.
The tribes' treaty-recognized sovereignty, which is not generally subject
to the federal or state constitutions"19 is, however, subject to being reduced
or completely eliminated by federal action120 and increasingly by state

"sThe Navajo Nation, for example, in 1994, worked out such an accord with the governors of Arizona,
New Mexico, and Utah. The idea behind the accord, according to the Navajo president, Peterson Zah, "is
that since we must coexist as neighbors we must recognize the sovereignty of one another in order to
effectively meet the needs of our common constituents and resolve our common problems." (Author has
copy of accord and Zah's memorandum describing the policy.)
"9See, for example, The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
'20See, for example, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903).
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